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Understanding the ‘New Governance’ of Food 
Safety: Regulatory Enrolment as a Response to 
Change in Public and Private Power
Paul Verbruggen*
Abstract
Profound changes in the landscape of food governance fundamentally challenge the capacity 
of individual regulators (national, international, public and private alike) to devise legitimate 
and effective systems of food safety governance. As a result, we observe an increased level 
of coordination between public and private regulatory activities, more and more frequently 
transcending national (jurisdictional) boundaries. This contribution aims to develop a 
better understanding of how such coordination is taking place, why and at what level. It 
argues that the concept of ‘regulatory enrolment’ provides a proper analytical lens through 
which the nature, properties and dynamics of regulatory regimes can be better understood. 
Regulatory enrolment offers a strategy for coping with change in regulatory capacities and 
power, and increasing regime complexity. Accordingly, regulators in the domain of food 
safety, and perhaps others, might harness their own legitimacy and effectiveness in ensuring 
regulatory outcomes.
Keywords
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1 Introduction
The governance of food safety has changed dramatically since the 1990s. The 
outbreak of recurrent major food safety crises, including Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE), the globalisation of food supply chains and the growing 
concentration of economic power amongst food retailers have made fertile ground 
for changes in the institutions and practices of food governance. At the same 
time, a general perception of failing public regulation and new concerns amongst 
consumers about animal welfare, dietary habits, the environment and fair trade 
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created strong demands for regulatory change.1 These changes have occurred 
across two key dimensions: (i) national systems of food governance have been 
increasingly subject to transnational influences, and (ii) public food governance 
has been challenged, complemented, or at times superseded, by private governance 
systems. Both transitions fundamentally challenge the capacity of individual 
regulators (national, international, public and private alike) to devise effective and 
legitimate systems of food safety governance. As a result, we observe an increased 
level of coordination between public and private regulatory activities, more and 
more frequently transcending national (jurisdictional) boundaries. In the literature 
on international relations, political economy and governance, this shift from a 
traditional command-and-control style of regulation towards a more coordinated, 
bottom-up approach has been coined ‘New Governance’.2  
This contribution aims to develop a better understanding of how such ‘New 
Governance’ and related coordination between public and private actors is taking 
place within the domain of food safety, why and at what level. To that end, it builds 
on the concept of ‘regulatory enrolment’ developed by Black.3 Regulatory enrolment 
can be seen as a governance response to regulatory change and regime complexity. It 
presupposes that the capacity for regulatory governance is dispersed among a variety 
of actors, none of which holds such a central position in the regulatory arena that they 
can unequivocally determine outcomes. In this decentred conception of regulation, 
enrolment provides ‘a normative framework for considering ways in which the 
capacity of the system as a whole might be enhanced effectively and legitimately by 
the careful deployment within it of the regulatory capacity of different actors’.4
1  Terry Marsden, Robert Lee, Andrew Flynn and Samarthia Thankappan, The New Regulation 
and Governance of Food. Beyond the Food Crisis? (Routledge 2010) 3–23; Tetty Havinga, Donal 
Casey and Frans Van Waarden, ‘Changing Regulatory Arrangements in Food Governance’ in 
Tetty Havinga, Frans Van Waarden and Donal Casey (eds), The Changing Landscape of Food 
Governance (Edward Elgar 2015) 3–18; Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga, ‘Introduction 
to the Special Issue on the Patterns of Interplay between Public and Private Food Regulation’ 
(2015) 6 EJRR 482, 482–84. 
2  See generally, Orly Lobel, ‘New Governance as Regulatory Governance’ in David Levi-
Faur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Governance (OUP 2012) 65; Ken Abbott and Duncan 
Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: 
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ (2009) 42 Vand J Transnat’l L 501.
3  See generally, Julia Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK 
Financial Services Regulation’ (2003) Pub L 63.
4  ibid 91.
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This article argues that regulatory enrolment, and the decentred analysis of 
regulation it builds on, provide a proper analytical lens through which the nature, 
properties and dynamics of regulatory regimes can be better understood. Regulatory 
enrolment then offers a strategy for coping with change in regulatory capacities 
and power, and increasing regime complexity. To make this claim, the article will 
first provide in Section 2 a deeper account of the concept of regulatory enrolment 
and its relationship to notions of ‘polycentric regulation’ and ‘regulatory capacity’ 
as developed in the literature on regulatory governance. Section 3 will provide a 
brief, yet systematic overview of the actors currently involved in the regulatory 
governance of food safety, by which their relative regulatory capacity and potential 
for enrolment are identified. Section 4 then offers insights into how regulatory 
enrolment is currently taking place, between which actors, why this occurs and at 
what level. Next, Section 5 considers the potential for enrolment—and its proper 
design—as a governance response to a key change in the regulatory domain of 
food safety, namely the rise of global supply chains. As such, it discusses the ways 
in which regulatory enrolment might harness the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
(some) actors in ensuring regulatory outcomes. Here, the article draws on previous 
empirical research conducted on the interplay between various actors concerned 
with the regulatory governance of food safety. Section 6 concludes with the 
analytical and strategic importance of regulatory enrolment.
2 Conceptualising regulatory enrolment
2.1 Regulatory regimes: functions, actors and space
In the literature on regulatory governance, we find many accounts of coordination 
between public and private regulatory activities through enrolment of various 
actors in regulatory regimes. These regimes can be defined as systems of collective 
control attempting to influence the behaviour of businesses according to predefined 
standards and goals.5 These systems are considered to be organised around three 
elements or functions, namely a set of normative standards and goals of some kind 
(standard-setting), processes for detecting deviation from these standards and 
5  For the definition of regulation, see generally, Philip Selznick, ‘Focusing Organizational 
Research on Regulation’ in Roger G Noll (ed), Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 
(University of California Press 1985) 363; Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflection on Regulation’ (2002) 
27 AJLP 26.
(2016) Vol 5 Issue 3       Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 421
 Understanding the ‘New Governance’ of Food Safety
objectives (monitoring), and mechanisms for correcting non-compliant behaviour 
(enforcement).6 
Regulatory regimes comprise a variety of different actors, each fulfilling 
different regulatory functions depending on their relative capacity. These actors 
might be categorised by using a very rough analytical distinction based on their 
institutional background, namely public (state) and private (market, non-state) 
actors. Regulatory regimes administered by state actors comprise standards 
developed through legislative processes and administrative decision-making, 
and that are monitored by regulatory agencies that can sanction non-compliant 
behaviour through legal sanctions. The archetype of a public regulator is said to 
be a regulatory agency in the United States (‘US’), to which frequently all three 
regulatory functions are delegated by primary legislation.7 Consequently, a public 
regulator cannot only set its own standards, but also has legal powers to monitor 
and enforce compliance by the regulated entities (regulatees). Non-state, market-
based regimes, by contrast, are driven by private actors such as firms, associations, 
non-government organisations (NGOs) or combinations of these. Regimes of 
‘pure’ or ‘voluntary’ self-regulation are free from active state involvement and may 
comprise the creation of industry codes of conduct that are monitored by peers and 
enforced through reputational market sanctions.8
Examples of these stylised and purely ‘public’ or ‘private’ regimes are hard to 
come by in practice, however. Almost inevitably, regulatory regimes will involve 
different kinds of actors in relation to one or more regulatory functions. For 
example, practices of notice and comment, public consultation and negotiated 
rule-making with regulatees are now common among US regulatory agencies in 
order to strengthen scientific and technical expertise and facilitate participation 
from industry and NGOs.9 Similarly, robust and effective regimes of private self-
regulation are seldom void of state interference as their creation is often coerced by 
the threat of government action.10 
6  Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert Baldwin (eds), The Government of Risk (OUP 
2001) 20–35.
7  For a comparative institutional view, see generally, John Francis, The Politics of Regulation: A 
Comparative Perspective (Blackwell 1993).
8  Julia Black, ‘Constitutionalising Self-Regulation’ (1996) 59 MLR 24; Margot Priest, ‘The 
Privatization of Regulation: Five Models of Self-regulation’ (1997) 29 Ottawa L Rev 233, 245. 
9  David Weimer, ‘The Puzzle of Private Rule-Making: Expertise, Flexibility and Blame Avoidance 
in US Regulation’ (2006) 66 Publ Admin Rev 569, 570–73.
10  See generally, Guy Halfteck, ‘Legislative Threats’ (2008) 61 SLR 629; Adrienne Héritier and 
Sandra Eckert, ‘New Modes of Governance in the Shadow of Hierarchy: Self-Regulation by 
Industry in Europe’ (2008) 28 J Pub Policy 113. More generally, see Neil Gunningham and 
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These empirical observations draw attention to the increasingly ‘fragmented’11 
and ‘hybrid’12 character of regulation: regulation is not the product of a single 
regulator, but is the outcome of a process involving a multitude of regulatory 
actors or different sites of regulation that interact in ‘complex, fluid and multi-
dimensional ways’.13 One of the most powerful accounts of this development is 
provided by Black. She promotes a ‘decentred’ analysis of regulation, which:
involves a move away from an understanding of regulation which assumes that 
governments have a monopoly in the exercise of power and control, that they occupy 
a position from which they can oversee the actions of others, and that those actions 
will be altered pursuant to government’s demand.14 
As Black explains in later writings, this analysis ‘draws attention away from 
individual regulatory bodies, be they at the national or global level, and emphasises 
instead the multitude of actors which constitute a regulatory regime in a particular 
domain’.15 While a decentred analysis of regulation thus denies the centrality of the 
state as a regulator and seeks to draw attention away from it, a polycentric approach 
more positively highlights the existence of multiple sites of regulation, either at 
sub-national, national or transnational level. At the core of both analyses is the 
claim that there is no ‘centre’ of regulation, no one position of an ultimate overseer 
or controller that a state or non-state actor can hold.
The understanding of regulation as decentred or polycentric invites the image 
of a regulatory space that is occupied by a variety of actors. The analytical construct 
of a regulatory space was first developed by Hancher and Moran16 based on Crouch’s 
metaphor of  ‘polity space’.17 The regulatory space is defined as ‘the range of regulatory 
Joseph Rees, ‘Industry Self-regulation. An Institutional Perspective’ (1997) 19 L & Pol’y 363.
11  Colin Scott, ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional Design’ 
(2001) Pub L 329, 334–38.
12  David Levi-Faur, ‘Regulation and Regulatory Governance’ in D. Levi-Faur (ed), Handbook on 
the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar 2011) 3.
13  Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, ‘Institutional Dynamics in a Re-ordering 
World’ in Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson (eds), Transnational Governance: 
Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (CUP 2006) 375, 386.
14  Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation 
in a “Post-regulatory” World’ (2001) 54 CLP 103, 112.
15  Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric 
Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regul’n & Governance 137, 139–40.
16  Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran, ‘Organising Regulatory Space’ in Leigh Hancher, Michael 
Moran (eds), Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (OUP 1989) 271.
17  Colin Crouch, ‘Sharing Public Space: States and Organized Interests in Western Europe’ in 
John Hall (ed), States in History (Basil Blackwell 1986) 177.
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issues subject to public decision’, including issues of safety or pricing in a particular 
domain.18 Because it is a space, it can be occupied and divided between different 
actors possessing different resources for regulation. However, understanding who 
occupies the space ‘involves examining the outcomes of competitive struggles, the 
resources used in those struggles, and the distribution of those resources between 
different involved institutions’.19 Of the many factors determining the shape of the 
regulatory space, and the relative position of the actors occupying it, Hancher and 
Moran draw attention to the importance of national legal culture in allowing access 
to the space, the element of timing and the organisational capacity of the actors.20
Again, the construct of the regulatory space emphasises that the capacity 
and resources for regulation are dispersed and fragmented among a wide range 
of actors.21 We might attempt to locate the different actors in the regulatory space 
by reference to two key analytical dimensions drawn in relation to these actors 
in the decentred and polycentric analysis of regulation, and the metaphor of 
regulatory space. The two dimensions are those of public-private and national-
transnational. Accordingly, four ‘quadrants’ are distinguished occupying different 
actors possessing different capacities for regulation.22 It should be emphasised, 
however, that any depiction of the regulatory space is only a representation of the 
actors at a given time. These actors, their interests and interrelationships, are not 
static and are subject to change over time.23 Understanding how these interests 
and interrelationships evolve is now a key topic for study by scholars of regulation. 
Moreover, the distinction between public-private actors is problematic as one of 
18  Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran (n 16) 277.
19  ibid 277.
20  ibid 279ff.
21  Scott (n 11).
22  See Figure 1 below. Also Abbott and Snidal provide an influential mapping of the regulatory 
space or landscape. Focusing on transnational standard-setting regimes, they draw a 
‘governance triangle’, the three angles of which are formed by states, firms and NGOs. Towards 
the centre of the triangle, different mixes of regimes are identified, leading to a total of seven 
separate areas of standard-setting. In this article this conceptualisation of the regulatory space 
is not taken as a starting point, since, in the domain of food safety, NGOs have so far played 
no relevant role. Using NGOs as a separate actor would therefore have little distinguishing 
function. What appears more important is the variety of actors and contested interests among 
private market actors, that is, between retailers, ie supermarket chains, manufacturers, ie 
major brand-name companies, farmers, and audit service providers as certification bodies. 
See Ken Abbott, Duncan Snidal (n 2); See in detail Tetty Havinga, ‘Conceptualizing Regulatory 
Arrangements: Complex Networks and Regulatory Roles’ in Havinga, Casey and Van Waarden 
2015 (n 1) 24–25.
23  Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran (n 16) 283.
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the key insights provided by a decentred analysis of regulation is that the socio-
political distinction between public-private regulation and governance has 
collapsed.24 Instead, we see a rise of ‘hybrid’ organisations combining state and 
non-state actors in multiple ways.25 Also the distinction between national and 
transnational actors might not be so clear given the insights of contemporary 
studies into global governance and regulation. As observed, such regulation in fact 
often constitutes a multi-level affair, in which transnational standards operate in, 
and are subject to, domestic legal orders. It must thus interact with national rules 
and institutions in order to have effect.26 
Therefore, what we need to study are the interactions between the various 
actors in the different quadrants of Figure 1. These interactions are essential for 
a fuller understanding of the regulatory regime. Regulatory enrolment, as will 
be argued below, provides a nexus through which different actors are linked in a 
regulatory space.
Figure 1. Regulatory space (own elaboration)
24  Julia Black (n 14) 110.
25  David Levi-Faur (n 12) 8–9.
26  See generally, Tim Bartley, ‘Transnational Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections 
of Public and Private Standards’ (2011) 12 Theoretical Inq L 517; Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli, 
The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (Princeton UP 
2011); Paul Verbruggen, ‘Gorillas in the Closet? Public and Private Actors in the Enforcement 
of Transnational Private Regulation’ (2013) 7 Regul’n & Governance 512.
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2.2 Regulatory capacity and regulatory enrolment
It has been noted that a decentred analysis of regulation—including accounts of 
the regulatory space—has little prescriptive edge and remains descriptive for the 
better part.27 Proponents of this analysis simply argue for a more holistic approach 
to the matter of regulation, stressing the relative regulatory capacity of different 
actors. Normativity appears to enter the analysis only in as far as it is suggested 
that government should be more ‘modest’ in setting its regulatory objectives, for 
the outcomes are not a function of their regulatory activities only.28 The theory of 
‘smart regulation’ as advanced by Gunningham and Grabosky can be seen as an 
early attempt to provide more normative guidance into how different actors—State, 
industry and civil society—and their relative regulatory capacities can and should 
be combined, either sequentially or simultaneously, to achieve regulatory outcomes 
most effectively.29 Their analysis, however, is first and foremost concerned with the 
deployment of enforcement capacity of actors to respond to and deter future non-
compliant behaviour by the regulatees, rather than to the use of other regulatory 
functions such as the drafting, implementation and adoption of standards by 
regulatees.
A more sophisticated and systematic analysis of the way in which regulatory 
functions could or should be distributed between actors given the relative regulatory 
capacity they possess now and in the future for regulation to be effective is offered 
by Black.30 Building on her notion of regulation as something that is fundamentally 
decentred and comprises the elements of standards and goals, monitoring and 
enforcement, she highlights the relative capacity of the actors concerned in a 
regulatory regime to contribute to the purposes of those seeking to regulate (the 
regulators). Regulatory capacity, as she notes, refers to ‘the actual or potential 
possession of resources plus the existence of actual and potential conditions that 
make it likely that those resources will be deployed both now and in the future 
in such a way as to further the identified goals of those seeking to regulate (…)’.31 
27  Colin Scott (n 11) 352.
28  Julia Black (n 3) 65.
29  Neil Gunningham and Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy 
(OUP 1998).
30  Julia Black (n 3).
31  ibid 72.
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Capacity thus not only refers to the possession of resources but also to the ability 
and willingness of the actors to put them to use.32 
Six key resources for performing regulatory functions are suggested: 
information, expertise, wealth, authority and legitimacy, strategic position, 
and organisational capacity.33 Each regulatory function requires a different 
configuration of resources to be performed effectively. While standard-setting 
typically requires a high need for information, expertise and authority and 
legitimacy, effective enforcement appears to create greater demands for strategic 
positioning and authority and legitimacy.34 Clearly, the resources for fulfilling 
a regulatory function are not evenly distributed amongst the actors concerned 
with a regulatory regime. Some may have many, others few and, again, others 
may possess only pivotal resources for a particular regulatory function. 
The actors’ possession of resources is also not static. It is subject to change, 
much like the configuration of actors in the regulatory regime. The assessment 
of regulatory capacity must thus take into account the resilience of regulatory 
capacity and its susceptibility to changes in the underlying resources.35 Moreover, 
actors may possess resources directly, while they may also have indirect access to 
them through another actor. These properties of regulatory capacity—dispersal, 
change, indirect availability—invites suggestions regarding ways in which 
one actor possessing a different kind and degree of regulatory capacity can be 
functionally linked to another so as to enhance the capacity of both actors. By 
joining, borrowing or alternating resources, actors may strengthen the capacity 
of any in achieving the regulatory goals. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the 
regime as a whole can also be increased.
32  Cafaggi and Pistor offer a different approach under the header of ‘regulatory capabilities’. 
Adopting the work by Nussbaum, they embark on an assessment of the impact of regulatory 
regimes designed by others on individuals, collectives and entities, and their relative ability 
to express their preferences, choose alternative forms of regulation or determine how best to 
govern interdependencies between different regulatory regimes. Accordingly, their concept is 
much more focused on regulatees and their ability to choose to be subject to the regulatory 
regime, in the sense of self-determination. See generally, Fabrizio Cafaggi and Katarina Pistor, 
‘Regulatory Capabilities: A Normative Framework for Assessing the Distributional Effects of 
Regulation’ (2015) 9 Regul’n & Governance 95.
33  Julia Black (n 3) 73ff; See generally, Colin Scott (n 11); Daniel Esty, ‘Toward Optimal 
Environmental Governance’ (1999) 74 NYU L Rev 1495.
34  Cf Julia Black (n 3) 81.
35  ibid 80.
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Regulatory enrolment is essentially a strategy for linking actors possessing 
a different configuration of regulatory capacity in a regulatory regime so as to 
enhance the capacity of both.36 Identifying who the actors are and what regulatory 
capacity they possess is thus a key task for those actively seeking to interlink with 
others. Enrolment can occur consciously or unconsciously, implicitly or explicitly, 
and with or without changes to the formal legal structures underpinning the 
regulatory regime. It does not imply a level of hierarchy between the actor 
enrolling the other and the actor being enrolled. In fact, enrolment is frequently 
mutual. As Black explains, often an actor is relying on, or seeking to deploy 
resources of, another actor in order to achieve its own goals, while the actor 
being enrolled is doing the same.37
Regulatory enrolment does not, of course, guarantee regulatory outcomes, 
nor does it offer full control to the actor doing the enrolling over the activities 
of the actor being enrolled. The advantages of the strategy are to be found in 
the increased regulatory capacity of individual actors or the regime as a whole 
to achieve regulatory goals at a given moment. For example, by being able to 
work with more detailed information about regulatory non-compliance provided 
by private auditing firms, State actors may determine what type of enforcement 
action is required more accurately and better refine their approach to secure 
compliance.38 Furthermore, the ability to use or rely on additional resources may 
also enhance the transnational reach of public regulatory activities, which are 
typically confined to territorial borders.39 In Black’s view, a focus on regulatory 
capacity and their enrolment allows for ‘considering ways in which the capacity 
of the system as a whole might be enhanced effectively and legitimately by the 
careful deployment within it of the regulatory capacities of different actors’.40
36  ibid 84.
37  ibid 85.
38  John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It Work Better 
(Edward Elgar 2008) 96.
39  Peter Drahos, ‘Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance 
Approach’ (2004) 77 Temple L Rev 401, 418–19.
40  Julia Black (n 3) 91.
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2.3 Distinguishing enrolment from other theories on regulation 
The concept behind regulatory enrolment has been discussed by many others. 
Braithwaite and Drahos, Abbott and Snidal, and Levi-Faur speak of ‘enlisting’ 
other actors and their capacities for regulatory purposes.41 More generally, 
regulatory enrolment clearly links to other theories in regulation concerning 
the inter-connectedness of actors and (regulatory) capacity. Network theory, for 
example, stresses that relationships between different actors in the network—or 
‘webs’—are informal, complex and unstable, with no real centre of authority and 
power.42 However, while the linkages between different actors might thus be 
relatively fluid and weak, their capacity for action can be enhanced by being part 
of the network.43 Drahos and Braithwaite have each argued individually that a 
network itself may be helpful in overcoming weaknesses in regulatory capacity. 
They contend that the resources provided by third parties can create network 
effects, allowing others—either state or non-state actors—to enhance their 
regulatory capacity.44 As Black explains, however, regulatory enrolment ‘does not 
necessarily imply that the actors exist in a network relationship, nor does it imply 
that this is an unqualified superior form of arrangement to other types of inter-
relationship’.45
Regulatory enrolment also closely lines up with the theory of orchestration 
as presented by Abbott and Snidal.46 This theory provides a normative framework 
for states and international governmental organisations (IGOs) to use their 
limited capacities for regulation at transnational level to support and empower 
other actors—firms, NGOs, intermediaries such as certification bodies, and 
multi-stakeholder schemes—to deploy their capacity to regulate firms and 
industries. As for IGOs, orchestration occurs when ‘an IGO enlists and supports 
41  John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (OUP 2000) 491; Ken Abbott 
and Duncan Snidal (n 2) 525; David Levi-Faur (n 12) 9. 
42  Frans van Waarden, ‘Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks’ (1992) 21 EJPR 29, 30–31.
43  Mark Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’ (1973) 78 Am J Sociol 1360, 1377–78.
44  Peter Drahos (n 39) 418–19; John Braithwaite (n 38) 83–84.
45  Julia Black (n 3) 85.
46  Ken Abbott and Duncan Snidal (n 2).
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intermediary actors to address target actors in pursuit of IGO governance goals’.47 
Such orchestration can be ‘indirect’ because the orchestrator works through 
intermediaries to influence regulated entities (‘targets’), and ‘soft’ because the 
orchestrator lacks authoritative control over intermediaries and targets. Abbott 
and Snidal consider orchestration to be particularly close to regulatory enrolment. 
As they note, ‘Orchestration is a specific strategy of enrolment’.48
However, orchestration differs from regulatory enrolment as it departs from 
the assumption that state actors still hold a central position in the (transnational) 
regulatory space, enabling them—at least in part—to direct, steer and control 
social phenomena, however indirectly that may be. A purist decentred or 
polycentric analysis of regulation, on which Black’s understanding of regulatory 
enrolment is cast, denies such centrality. Moreover, the theory of orchestration 
was developed in response to perceived gaps in the ability of state actors to respond 
to apparent failures to address production externalities in global markets. It is 
also primarily focused on, or limited to, the function of standard-setting. While 
regulatory enrolment is responsive to the changing role of the state in regulating 
global markets and its diminishing capacity for standard-setting, its application 
is not limited to transnational governance and standard-setting as such. It may 
also involve national and local-level interaction between different actors across 
the full range of regulatory functions in a domain.
3 The regulatory space of food safety
The regulatory space of food safety, including hygiene, may be dissected into 
spheres populated by public and private actors. In turn, each of these spheres 
may, again for analytical purposes only, be partitioned into a transnational and 
national sphere. Based on this categorisation, actors involved in the regulation of 
food safety may occupy a particular position within one of the four quadrants as 
illustrated by Figure 2.
47  Kenneth W Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal and Bernhard Zangl, ‘Orchestration: 
Global Governance Through Intermediaries’ in Kenneth W Abbott, Phillip Genschel, Duncan 
Snidal and Bernard Zangl (eds), International Organizations as Orchestrators (CUP 2015) 4.
48  Ken Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational: Strategies for 
International Organizations’ (2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 95, 98.
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Figure 2 Regulatory space of food safety (own elaboration)
Abbreviations (in alphabetical order): ABs (accreditation bodies), Codex (Codex 
Alimentarius Commission), DG SANTE (Directorate General for Health and Food 
Safety—Direction Générale Sanité et Sécurité Alimentaire), EU (European Union), 
EFSA (European Food Safety Authority) FDA (US Food and Drug Administration), 
FLEP (Food Law Enforcement Practitioners), FSA (Food Standards Agency), GFSI 
(Global Food Safety Initiative), ISO (International Standardization Organization), 
NVWA (Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority—Nederlandse 
Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit), WHO (World Health Organization), WTO (World 
Trade Organization). 
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3.1 Public sphere 
The public sphere of the regulatory space of food safety (Quadrants I and II) is 
populated by global, regional, national and local state actors.49 At a global level, the 
WTO is a key player. The international trade agreements developed by the WTO 
regulate global trade in food. More specifically, the Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) determines the conditions under which Member 
States can adopt measures for the protection of the health of humans, animals and 
plants. One of those conditions concerns the equivalence of the measures adopted 
with standards developed by Codex, an expert body created by the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO) 
to devise international standards and guidelines for food. Compliance by Member 
States with Codex standards infers compliance with the SPS Agreement. One of the 
key standards adopted by Codex related to food safety is the Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP) standard, which provides a systematic method 
for identifying and controlling hazards associated with food operations in the 
supply chain. 
At a regional level, the European Union (EU) is a key institutional actor in 
the public sphere. The outbreak of the BSE crisis in 1996 in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and later in the EU can be seen as the birth of modern EU food safety law. The 
crisis revealed significant dysfunctions both in industry practices and the public 
systems supervising those practices. It also set off a process of harmonisation of 
national food safety laws and the creation of EU agencies in the field of food safety.50 
Regulation 178/2001/EC currently provides the general legal framework for food 
safety regulation in the EU.51 This Regulation also created ESFA with the principal 
aim of providing EU Institutions and Member States with scientific and technical 
opinions on the adoption of EU food legislation and policies, and on the resolution 
of food safety incidents. To ensure effective monitoring and enforcement of the 
49  See, for an overview, Caoimhín MacMaoláin, Food Law. European, Domestic and International 
Frameworks (Hart 2015) 45.
50  Ellen Vos, ‘EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis’ (2000) 23 J Consum 
Policy 227.
51  Regulation (EC) 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 
lays down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishes the European Food 
Safety Authority and lays down procedures in matters of food safety [2002] OJ L31/1.
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Regulation, the EU has adopted secondary legislation detailing the obligations 
of Member States and their authorities to control food safety. The European 
Commission carries out inspections in Member States through its Health and 
Food Audits and Analysis Directorate, formerly known as the Food and Veterinary 
Office. This service seeks to ensure that effective official control systems are in place 
and evaluate compliance with EU food safety laws within the EU. The Health and 
Food Audits and Analysis Directorate resides under the Directorate General for 
Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) of the European Commission. This Director 
General also drafts and proposes EU laws on product and food safety. The Food 
Law Enforcement Practitioners (FLEP) provides an informal network for food law 
enforcement practitioners in Europe to exchange information, foster learning and 
cross-border co-operation, and develop mutual trust in the resolution of practical 
control problems. Accordingly, this network presents a subtle cross-over between 
the transnational (EU) and national sphere.
At a national level, food safety regulation is set and administered by 
ministries and departments, and national food safety agencies. These agencies 
take the form of independent regulatory agencies, for example, the Food and Drug 
Administration in the US, the Food Standards Agency in the UK, or as an executive 
service of a ministry, like the NVWA in the Netherlands. Food safety agencies, at 
least in Europe, liaise with each other either through formal institutions, such as 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) or informal networks, such as FLEP. 
Enforcement of food safety laws may be the responsibility of the agencies or 
ministries, or they may share such responsibility with local enforcement officers at 
state, city or commune level. 
3.2 Private sphere52
The private sphere of the regulatory space (Quadrants III and IV) is occupied by 
a range of different actors operating at transnational—global and regional—and 
52  NGOs squarely belong to the private sphere. Nonetheless, they are absent in the discussion 
here. As noted above (n 22), NGOs do not play a role of significance in the domain of food 
safety, in sharp contrast to social and sustainability aspects of the production, sourcing and 
marketing of food.
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national level. Certification scheme owners have become principal institutional 
actors in the governance of food safety.53 Schemes like British Retail Consortium 
(BRC), Food Safety System Certification 22000 (FSSC 22000), Global Partnership for 
Good Agricultural Practices (GLOBALG.A.P.), International Food Standard (IFS), 
Safe Quality Food (SQF) dominate agri-food supply chains and food manufacture. 
In a survey held among quality and safety directors of major food retailers in The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the 
respondents estimated that between 75 and 99 per cent of all food products supplied 
were certified on the basis of the private food standards part of the schemes.54 The 
schemes are governed by major retailers—for instance,  Ahold/Delhaize, Carrefour, 
Tesco, Wal-Mart etc, multi-national brand-name manufacturers, like Kraft, Nestlé, 
Unilever etc, and/or global audit service providers, like Bureau Veritas, Lloyds, 
Société Générale de Surveillance, etc. To ensure more coordination amongst these 
schemes and reduce costs of multiple—and partly overlapping—audits for food 
business operators, scheme owners established Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). 
This organisation benchmarks individual schemes in order to provide a level 
playing field among these schemes, such that, once a food business is certified for 
one scheme, its certification is accepted under other schemes as well.55 Nonetheless, 
retailers and brand-name companies have been observed continuing to impose 
their own food safety assurance systems on actors in their global supply chains and 
foreign subsidiaries, mainly through strategies of Corporate Social Responsibility.56
The private standards adopted under transnational certification schemes 
require implementation at national, local level. Audit service providers, including 
auditors, certifiers, consultants, are key players in this implementation process.57 
53  Spenser Henson and John Humphrey, ‘The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the 
Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes’, Paper Prepared for FAO/WHO (2009), 
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1132e/i1132e00.pdf> accessed 15 January 2016.
54  Linda Fulponi, ‘Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: The Perspective of Major 
Food Retailers in OECD Countries’ (2006) 31 Food Policy 1, 6.
55  Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga, ‘The Rise of Transnational Private Meta-Regulators’ (2016) 
21 Tilburg L Rev 116; Fabrizio Cafaggi, ‘Transnational Private Regulation: Regulating Global 
Private Regulators’ in Sabino Cassese (ed), Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 212.
56  Spenser Henson and John Humphrey (n 53) 4.
57  Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga, ‘Food Safety Meta-Controls in the Netherlands’ (2015) 6 
EJRR 512.
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Transnational schemes may also have national spin-offs or accept national 
standards as equivalent. An example is provided by GLOBALG.A.P., the most 
widely implemented transnational food safety standard for agri-food in the world, 
which has devised a benchmarking process through which it has recognised 
national schemes to be equivalent to GLOBALG.A.P. certification for the module 
against which it was successfully benchmarked. Such national standards include 
ChiliGAP, ChinaGAP and KenyaGAP, as well as the ‘Red Tractor Farm Assurance’ 
scheme in the UK, the Qualität und Sicherheit (Quality and Safety) scheme in 
Germany and the IKB Varken (IKB Pigs) scheme in the Netherlands.58 In addition 
there are national assurance schemes administered by national trade associations 
or audit service providers, such as the American Institute of Baking in the US and 
RiskPlaza in the Netherlands. Finally, we can distinguish individual companies in 
the food industry, known as food business operators, that are the ultimate targets 
of food safety legislation. To implement these laws, however, they may design 
firm-specific systems of food safety control (HACCP systems) that in turn can be 
enforced by national food safety agencies.59
3.3 Hybrids
The allocation of the actors’ position in the regulatory space of food safety as set 
out in Figure 2 might be said to be quite arbitrary for—as we will see in detail 
in Section 4—actors may influence and enrol other actors positioned in different 
quadrants of the space. There are also a number of actors that are part of the 
regulatory regime of food safety that are difficult to classify as either public or 
private, working at national or transnational level. They are ‘hybrids’, either residing 
at the intersection of the public-private sphere, the national-transnational sphere, 
or even both.
Accreditation bodies (ABs) are an example of a public-private hybrid. 
Accreditation can be defined as an attestation that a certification body meets 
the requirements to carry out specific conformity assessment activities. The 
58  GLOBALG.A.P., ‘Benchmarked Resembling Schemes’ <http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/what- 
we-do/the-gg-system/benchmarking/BM-Resembling/index.html> accessed 15 January 2016.
59  Robin Fairman and Charlotte Yapp, ‘Enforced Self-Regulation, Prescription, and Conceptions 
of Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement’ (2005) 27 L & Pol’y 491.
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organisations providing the attestation—ABs—are key actors in the regulatory 
space. All the GFSI benchmarked schemes require that the certification bodies that 
perform the audit under the scheme have been accredited. Put simply, accredited 
third-party certification is now the industry standard.60 The nature of these ABs is 
unclear, however. In the EU, Regulation 765/2008/EC on accreditation and market 
surveillance lays down general principles for the operation and organisation 
of national ABs.61 Article 4(5) of this Regulation requires that if accreditation is 
not directly provided by a public authority, the Member States are held formally 
to recognise the accreditation activities of the national AB as a public authority 
activity. This implies that if accreditation is provided by a private law organisation, 
for example, a foundation or a corporation, it is attributed a semi-public law status 
upon formal recognition. While ABs might thus be private sector bodies, by their 
regulatory function, they should be considered public as far as accreditation 
services are concerned.
An example of a national-transnational hybrid is provided by global audit 
service providers. The rise of transnational private food standards has created 
a demand for firms that can provide audit and inspection services across the 
globe. Blair, Williams and Lin speak of ‘a rapidly growing global army of privately 
trained and authorised inspectors and certifiers’.62 This industry of audit service 
providers consists of multi-national firms such as the Bureau Veritas Group, Det 
Norske Veritas, Lloyds, Registro Italiano Navale, Société Générale de Surveillance, 
and the Technischer Überwachungsverein that have national subsidiaries or 
contracted auditors and inspectors on all continents.63 While these actors and their 
60  Maki Hatanaka, Carmen Bain and Lawrence Busch, ‘Third Party Certification in the Global 
Agrifood System’ (2005) 30 Food Policy 354.
61  These requirements include conditions of independence, impartiality, objectivity and 
competency. See Articles 8 to 12 Regulation (EC) 765/2008 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market 
surveillance relating to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93 
[2008] OJ L 218/30.
62  Margaret Blair, Cynthia Williams and Li-Wen Lin, ‘The New Role for Assurance Services in 
Global Commerce’ (2008) 33 J Corp L 325, 329.
63  Société Générale de Surveillance, for example, notes to have ‘over 1,800 offices and laboratories 
and more than 85,000 employees around the world’. See <http://www.sgs.com/en/Office-
Directory.aspx> accessed 15 January 2016.
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subsidiaries are all incorporated into national legal orders, their service provision 
is cross-border.64 
Finally, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) can be 
considered to involve a variation of hybridisation in the regulatory space of food 
safety. ISO develops voluntary standards that apply to a wide variety of domains, 
including food safety, and are available on payment of a fee. A key standard for food 
is the ISO 22000 standard on ‘Food Safety Management Systems – Requirements 
for Any Organisation in the Food Chain’, which was adopted in 2005 and has served 
as a baseline for other standards in the domain, including the GFSI’s benchmarking 
document and FSSC 22000. Furthermore, ISO provides private standards for 
certification and accreditation services, including ISO/IEC 17021:2006, ISO/TS 
22003, and ISO 17011:2004 which are widely used by scheme owners, ABs and 
even state actors to assess whether certification bodies are equipped to carry out 
certification services. ISO itself, however, is a private association under Swiss civil 
law whose membership is comprised of national standardisation bodies, which 
may be public, quasi-public or private in nature.65 Therefore, ISO constitutes a 
meta-organisation of national–public or private standardisation bodies that has, as 
its main objective, setting transnational standards.
4 Strategies for enrolment 
Regulatory enrolment is a strategy that is frequently applied in the domain of food 
safety by different actors, for different regulatory functions, and with a view to 
enrolling different types of resources. We can distinguish between six different 
64  Société Générale de Surveillance, for example, notes in a marketing communication on ‘food 
safety, quality and sustainability solutions’ the following:  A Global Reach with A Local Touch: 
‘Our approach for delivering services to our clients is harmonised, leveraging the largest 
independent network of experts in the world. With a presence in nearly every single region 
around the globe, our experts speak the local language, understand the culture of the local 
market and operate globally in a consistent, reliable and cost-effective manner.’ <http://www.
sgs.com/~/media/Global/Documents/Brochures/SGS%20CTS%20Food%20Brochure%20
Hyb%20EN%202013.pdf> accessed 15 January 2016. 
65  Codex Alimentarius Commission, ‘Consideration of the Impact of Private Standards, Joint 
FAO/WTO Food Standards Programme’, Report presented at 33rd Session Geneva, Switzerland, 
5–9 July 2010 (CX/CAC 10/33/13) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Meetings/CAC/cac33/cac33_13e.
pdf> accessed 15 January 2016.
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avenues or strategies for such enrolment—either one-directional or mutual—













Figure 3 Regulatory enrolment in food safety (own elaboration)
The analysis below will provide examples of the avenues for enrolment, detailing 
the actors and resources that are enrolled, why this is taking place and how 
enrolment occurs, ie, consciously or unconsciously, implicitly or explicitly, and 
with or without changes to formal legal structures.
4.1 Transnational public – national public
The influence of international public law and IGOs on national food safety laws 
is a topic that has been well studied by scholars of food law and governance. 
That influence has been noted as being pervasive, in particular in the EU. As 
MacMaoláin observes for the UK, ‘it is the EU membership which has led to the 
vast majority of food safety laws as they stand (...)’.66 The same is true for other 
66  Caoimhín MacMaoláin (n 49) 10.
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EU Member States. The current design of EU food safety law depends heavily on 
a multi-level system of governance in which the EU and its independent agency 
ESFA enrol national governments and food safety authorities to ensure uniform 
and coherent application of food safety rules across EU territory.67 Accordingly, 
they enrol the resources of national public actors such as information, wealth, 
strategic positioning and organisational capacity. As regards information, for 
example, the European Commission has set in place a ‘Rapid Alert System for 
Food and Feed’, which enables information to be shared efficiently between EU-28 
national food safety authorities, the Commission, EFSA and other stakeholders 
within the European Economic Area. Accordingly, notifications of food safety 
risks and related outbreaks enable the EU and national authorities to devise 
swift, collective and efficient strategies for addressing these incidents. Conversely, 
national public agencies have enrolled the EU to enhance their regulatory capacity 
in terms of authority and legitimacy and expertise. One of the key considerations 
underpinning the new design of EU food safety law was the lack of trust and 
confidence of the general public in the capacity of national authorities to deal 
with cross-border food safety outbreaks in the aftermath of the BSE crisis.68 The 
creation of strong EU institutions and the ability to work with them would thus 
enhance the authority and legitimacy of national agencies. The creation of EFSA 
also responded to the need for national governments to have objective scientific 
and technical information for the resolution of food safety incidents.69 Expertise 
was thus sought as a resource.
4.2 Transnational public – transnational private
An example of the enrolment occurring between actors positioned in Quadrants II 
and III concerns the interplay between Codex and transnational private certification 
schemes as regards Codex standards. As noted, a key standard adopted by Codex 
is the HACCP standard, which provides a systematic method for identifying and 
controlling hazards associated with food operations in the supply chain. In 1969, 
67  Ellen Vos and Frank Wendler, ‘Food Safety Regulation at the EU Level’ in Ellen Vos and 
Frank Wendler (eds), Food Safety Regulation in Europe. A Comparative Institutional Analysis 
(Intersentia 2006) 65.
68  Ellen Vos (n 50) 228, 242; Caoimhín MacMaoláin (n 49) 132–33.
69  Harry Kuiper, ‘The Role of Scientific Experts in Risk Regulation of Foods’, in Michelle Everson 
and Eleen Vos (eds), Uncertain Risks Regulated (Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 389.
(2016) Vol 5 Issue 3       Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 439
 Understanding the ‘New Governance’ of Food Safety
Codex adopted the International Code of Practice General Principle of Food 
Hygiene, which promoted the use of the HACCP standard.70 This Code has had 
a strong influence not only on the design of national food safety laws, but also 
on the scope and content of (transnational) private food safety regulation. Like 
states, private certification scheme owners have based their respective schemes 
on Codex’s HACCP standard. Other standards adopted by Codex relating to food 
safety, such as standards for Good Agricultural Practice and Good Manufacturing 
Practice, have also been used as a basis for these schemes.71 In fact, the Food Safety 
System Certification 22000 scheme and Safe Quality Food Institute 2000 Code 
even make explicit reference to Codex as one of the authoritative sources on which 
their standards are based.72 Also the GFSI Guidance Document, which is used to 
perform the GFSI benchmarking process, is said to contain substantive elements of 
four different Codex standards.73 
We thus observe a strong reliance by transnational private certification 
schemes on Codex standards in relation to the regulatory function of standard-
setting. Resources that they seek to enrol to strengthen their own regulatory 
capacity are primarily related to authority and legitimacy, and to expertise. These 
schemes face an immediate legitimacy deficit because of an apparent lack of 
democratic process of participation or a delegation of statutory powers by national 
governments or IGOs. Such deficits are accentuated by the fact that traditional 
accountability mechanisms such as parliamentary committees, auditors, courts 
or ombudsman schemes do not readily apply to these private regimes.74 Being 
legitimate has been said to have been particularly valuable to private regulatory 
70  Codex Alimentarius Commission, ‘Recommended International Code of Practice General 
Principle of Food Hygiene’ (CAC/RCP 1-1969, Rev. 4-2003). 
71  Spenser Henson and John Humphrey (n 53) 37.
72  See FFSC, ‘FSSC 22000 Certification, Part I – Requirements for Organizations that Require 
Certification’ (Version 3.2, February 2015), at 3 <http://www.fssc22000.com/documents/pdf/
certification-scheme/fssc22000_part1_v3.2_2015.pdf> accessed 15 January 2016; SQFI, ‘SQF 
Code’ (Edition 7.2, July 2014) at 1, 45, 56 <http://www.sqfi.com/wp-content/uploads/SQF-
Code_Ed-7.2-July.pdf> accessed 15 January 2016. 
73  These are the International Code of Practice-General Principles of Food Hygiene (2003), 
Principles for Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification (1969), Guidelines for the 
Validation of Food Safety Control Measures (2008) and Principles for Traceability/Product 
Tracing as a Tool within a Food Inspection and Certification System (2006). See Kevin Swoffer, 
‘GFSI and the Relationship with Codex’ (Presentation to CIES International Food Safety 
Conference, Paris 2009). See Spenser Henson and John Humphrey (n 53) 39.
74  Deirdre Curtin and Linda Senden, ‘Public Accountability of Transnational Private Regulation: 
Chimera or Reality?’ (2011) 38 J Law & Soc 163.
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regimes because they require that those parties affected by their authority accept 
these regimes and modify their behaviour in accordance with the regulatory norms 
or goals they set.75 WTO members have also expressed their concern that private 
food standards are not science-based.76 Therefore, building on well-established and 
widely accepted standards developed by an expert body created by United Nations 
organisations—FAO and WHO—has been a key strategy for responding to 
legitimacy deficits and helping to bolster the authority and capacity of the private 
certification schemes.77
4.3 Transnational public – national private
Enrolment of national private actors by a transnational public actor occurs in the 
case of the promotion of ‘Guides to Good Hygienic Practice’ by the EU and the 
European Commission. Regulation 852/2004/EC lays down the general hygiene 
requirements to be respected by food business operators in the food supply chain.78 
One of the principal obligations for these operators based on Article 5(1) of this 
Regulation is to ‘put in place, implement and maintain a permanent procedure 
based on [HACCP] principles’. In the literature it has been noted that the design 
and implementation of a HACCP system is particularly troublesome for Small and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), as this approach demands great expertise and 
financial resources, which this type of food business operators typically lack.79 Since 
SMEs make up the larger part of the food industry in the EU,80 Regulation 852/2004/
75  Julia Black (n 15) 148.
76  WTO – Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ‘Summary of the Meeting of 24 
October 2005, resumed on 1–2 February 2006’ G/SPS/R/39 (2006) 38.
77  For the strategy pursued by GLOBALG.A.P., see Donal Casey, ‘The Legitimation of Non-State 
Regulatory Organisations: The Case of GLOBALG.A.P.’s Management of Legitimacy, 1996-
2011’ (PhD thesis, University College Dublin 2014) 234–71, 281–94. 
78  Council Regulation (EC) 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 
2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs [2004] OJ L226/3.
79  See generally, Robin Fairman and Charlotte Yapp (n 59); Ladina Caduff and Thomas Bernauer, 
‘Managing Risk and Regulation in European Food Safety Governance’ (2006) 23 Rev Pol’y Res 
153.
80  Approximately 14.5 million farmers and 310,000 food and drink producing companies exist in 
the EU. 99% of these food and drink companies are SMEs, which collectively represent about 
42% of the revenues of the European food production market. See European Commission, 
‘European Industry in a Changing World. Updated Sectoral Review 2009’, SEC (2009) 1111, 
69–70.
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EC assists operators in ensuring compliance with the HACCP requirement in that it 
offers these firms the choice either to develop and implement their own company-
specific food safety management system or adopt an applicable ‘Guide to Good 
Hygienic Practice’. At a national level, such guides are adopted and implemented 
by the food industry or a specific sector within it, subject to approval by a national 
competent government authority, such as a ministry or an independent food safety 
agency. The European Commission runs a registration system in which the national 
guides are made publicly available. In 2015, over 400 national guides were registered 
in this system.81 Collectively, these guides help to provide cost-efficient alternatives 
for food business operators to design individual company HACCP management 
systems. As the European Commission notes: ‘Guides to good practice for hygiene 
and for the application of the HACCP principles developed by the food business 
sectors themselves should help businesses to implement HACCP-based procedures 
tailored to the characteristics of their production.’82 Accordingly, these guides may 
assist food businesses to comply with procedural obligations expressed in the EU 
laws.
The inclusion of Guides to Good Hygienic Practice within the EU regulatory 
framework on food safety had the clear overall objective to enhance the capacity of 
food business operators, in particular SMEs, to comply with the newly introduced 
legal HACCP requirements. By enrolling national private actors involved in the 
adoption of these guides, the EU and European Commission sought to build on 
resources within the food industry to work towards implementation of the HACCP 
standard. An important resource these actors possess concerns information about 
current industry practices and demands for guidance on how to gain compliance. 
Trade associations indeed serve as pivotal communication channels in the supply 
and demand of such information as they are strategically positioned to gather input 
about concerns over compliance. That also makes them key actors for the adoption 
of common standards on HACCP compliance. As membership organisations, trade 
associations can be said to enjoy a strong degree of legitimacy of food business 
operators. Experience with the development and use of national guides provides 
81  European Commission, ‘Register for National Guides to Good Practice’ (last updated 11 
November 2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/hygienelegislation/docs/register_
national_guides_en.pdf> accessed 15 January 2016.
82  European Commission, ‘Guidance document on the implementation of certain provisions 
of Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs’ (18 June 2012) at 13 <http://
ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/hygienelegislation/docs/guidance_doc_852-2004_en.pdf> 
accessed 15 January 2016.
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another argument for relying on private industry actors in the implementation of 
EU law. In the Netherlands, for example, guides on good hygiene practice have 
been a widely used instrument in non-industrial food sectors for over 25 years.83 
Enrolment of national guides by the EU legislature within the EU framework of 
food safety law also provides benefits to the private actors involved in the adoption 
of such guides. Approval and recognition as part of that framework also grants a 
greater degree of authority and legitimacy to the standard-setting activities of the 
private actors.
4.4 National public – national private
Related to the implementation of the HACCP requirements as set out by Regulation 
852/2004/EC in the EU, is the interplay between national public authorities for food 
safety enforcement and food business operators. As Article 5(2) of this Regulation 
stipulates, the HACCP standard requires all food businesses along the supply 
chain to have in place self-assessment systems that are tailored to their business 
processes to identify the potential hazards concerned within their individual 
operations, implement and monitor controls, and document this process. This 
requirement does not apply to primary producers, such farmers and growers. 
Public food safety authorities enforce compliance with these privately established 
systems. This arrangement of company-level self-regulation that is approved and 
enforced by public actors has been discussed in the literature under the concepts 
of ‘enforced self-regulation’ and ‘management-based regulation’.84 The introduction 
of the HACCP standard as a regulatory requirement for food business operators in 
EU food safety law has been said to have triggered the widespread use of enforced 
self-regulation throughout the EU.85
83  Tetty Havinga, ‘National Variations in the Implementation and Enforcement of European Food 
Hygiene Regulations. Comparing the Structure of Food Controls and Regulations between 
Scotland and the Netherlands’ (2014) 35 Recht der Werkelijkheid - Cahiers d’Anthropologie 
du Droit 32, 38.
84  See generally, John Braithwaite, ‘Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate 
Crime Control’ (1982) 80 Mich L Rev 1466; Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management-
based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals’ (2003) 37 Law 
Soc Rev 691.
85  Marian Garcia Martinez, Andrew Fearne, Julie Caswell and Spencer Henson, ‘Co-regulation as 
a Possible Model for Food Safety Governance: Opportunities for Public-Private Partnerships’ 
(2007) 32 Food Policy 299.
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Enforced self-regulation is a regulatory strategy in which the regulatory 
resources of national public and private actors are combined and mixed to enhance 
the effectiveness and efficiency of regulatory outcomes. As regulatory standards are 
adopted by the firm itself and approved by the public agency, they are claimed to 
be more closely attuned to the business operations than to state regulation, more 
comprehensive and easier to amend. They also enjoy greater acceptance, induce 
fewer compliance costs for firms and thus lead to higher levels of compliance.86 
In other words, by deploying the strategy of enforced self-regulation, national 
public agencies tap into key resources of the regulated firm to attain compliance. 
These resources first of all concern information about compliance. While public 
regulators may possess such information, and lots of it, they cannot possibly know 
as much as the firm itself. Also assessing and understanding the information 
might be more complicated for agencies than for the firm itself. In addition, the 
agency relies on the resources of expertise, wealth and authority of regulated 
firms to implement legal requirements in business processes and its staff members. 
Conversely, the individual firm may seek to enrol a public agency by applying 
for approval of its HACCP system in order to receive information about how to 
gain regulatory compliance. Approval also provides the firm with authority and 
legitimacy in pursuing its company policy vis-à-vis staff members internally, and 
suppliers and buyers externally. 
However, the implementation of enforced self-regulation has proven to be 
not without its problems. While its deployment was intended to create efficiency in 
the allocation of scarce public enforcement resources, the regulatory strategy has 
been reported to be very time-consuming and laborious for individual enforcement 
officers, in particular when carrying out inspections at SMEs.87 The success of 
enforced self-regulation is fundamentally dependent on the capacity of the firms 
concerned to understand and manage HACCP-based systems. However, resources 
to do so, in particular those of expertise and funding, are typically lacking among 
SMEs.88 Consequently, public agencies need to allocate more time to educate food 
business operators on food safety hazards, which in turn leads to a situation in 
which the original objective of the approach—ie, efficiency—is undermined. Here, 
the analytical framework for regulatory enrolment as proposed by Black could 
provide better insight into how to overcome these problems.
86  John Braithwaite (n 84) 1474–83.
87  Robin Fairman and Charlotte Yapp (n 59) 516.
88  ibid 504.
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4.5 National public – transnational private
Enrolment of transnational private actors by national public actors is in the process 
of development. In the past decade, public enforcement agencies in jurisdictions 
such as Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, have designed various 
collaborative regulatory arrangements with private assurance schemes to deploy 
their resources in more efficient and innovative ways.89 So far, these assurance 
schemes have been primarily national in scope. A recent development has been the 
coordination of public food safety controls with transnational private certification 
schemes. A key actor in this development is the Netherlands Food and Consumer 
Product Safety Authority (NVWA), which has recently developed a policy of 
assessing private systems of food safety controls so as to use these private systems 
in its own enforcement activities. Compliance under private regulatory systems 
would lead to a reduction in the frequency of official inspections, or sometimes, 
the complete absence of such inspections.90 NVWA is considering extending 
this policy to transnational private certification schemes benchmarked by GFSI. 
By doing so, it seeks to enrol the key resources these schemes possess, including 
information, wealth, strategic position and organisational capacity. A principal 
explanation by NVWA for pursuing this policy is related to the fact that its own 
capacity to regulate food safety has come under pressure due to the globalisation of 
food supply chains, and recurrent institutional reforms and budget cuts.91 
GFSI, on the other hand, has been keen to engage with national and 
transnational public actors. Through its ‘Global Regulatory Affairs Working 
Group’ it has sought to encourage governments to understand and recognise the 
credibility of the GFSI process and to gain recognition by public regulators in 
Canada, the EU and US of GFSI-benchmarked schemes as an accepted tool to help 
them prioritise their food safety compliance resources and factory inspection.92 
By pursuing this strategy of engagement, GFSI seeks to enrol the authority and 
legitimacy of public actors, while sharing information on how they might design 
89  For an overview of the developments of collaborative regulatory arrangements in these 
countries, see Marian Garcia Martinez, Andrew Fearne, Julie Caswell and Spencer Henson (n 
85); Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga (n 57).
90  Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga (n 57) 521–22.
91  ibid 514.
92  Tetty Havinga and Paul Verbruggen, ‘The Global Food Safety Initiative and State Actors: Paving 
the Way for Hybrid Food Safety Governance’ in Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga (eds), 
Hybridization of Food Governance: Types, Trends and Results (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
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accreditation programmes for enrolling GFSI-benchmarked schemes in inspection 
and enforcement policies. It has been widely acknowledged that third-party 
certification schemes benchmarked by GFSI face problems in terms of auditor 
competence and auditor independence.93 Enrolling national governments and 
IGOs in its regime is part of a wider effort to address these issues.94
4.6 Transnational private – national private
Finally, transnational and national private actors may enrol each other’s resources 
to strengthen their capacity to achieve their respective regulatory goals. An 
example is provided by GLOBALG.A.P., which, as noted above, provides for a 
benchmarking process through which national schemes are recognised to be 
equivalent to GLOBALG.A.P. certification for the module against which they have 
been successfully benchmarked. As a result, farmers certified by the benchmarked 
national schemes benefit from the worldwide application and acceptance by 
GLOBALG.A.P. of certification in markets for primary produce, including fruit 
and vegetables, dairy, beef, poultry, pigs and plants. This is a dominant motivation 
for national schemes to apply for the benchmarking process. As some observers 
have noted, GLOBALG.A.P. benchmarking is ‘a marketing instrument to expand 
export market’.95 After all, if national schemes succeed in being benchmarked, they 
can offer their (potentially) certified farmers the prospect of being able to access 
global supply chains for primary produce and enter the most profitable markets 
(EU, North America, Australia), which are typically dominated by major Western 
supermarket chains.96 The key resources these national schemes thus enrol concern 
the strategic positioning, organisational capacity, and authority and legitimacy of 
GLOBALG.A.P. as the world’s biggest certification scheme for primary produce. For 
GLOBALG.A.P., on the other hand, the incentive to organise enrolment through its 
benchmarking process is to be able to coordinate its own regulatory activities with 
93  Timothy Lytton and Lesley McAllister, ‘Oversight in Private Food Safety Auditing: Addressing 
Auditor Conflict of Interest’ (2014) Wis Law Rev 289, 297–304. 
94  Tetty Havinga and Paul Verbruggen (n 92).
95  Olga Van der Valk and Joop van der Roest, ‘National Benchmarking against GlobalG.A.P.: 
Case Studies of Good Agricultural Practices in Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico and Chile’ Report 
2008–079 (April 2009) <http://edepot.wur.nl/11453> accessed 15 January 2016. 
96  Paul Verbruggen, Enforcing Transnational Private Regulation: A Comparative Analysis of 
Advertising and Food Safety (Edward Elgar 2014) 181–82.
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different and, at times, competing national private food safety regimes. Moreover, 
it enrols resources such as information, expertise and strategic position from local 
actors to be included in the GLOBALG.A.P. standard-setting procedures headed by 
its national technical working groups. Also such enrolment has been considered a 
key strategy of GLOBALG.A.P. in managing its legitimacy vis-à-vis state and non-
state actors.97
5  Regulatory enrolment as a governance response to change
A key contention of the detailed analysis of the regulatory capacity and related 
resources of different actors constituting a regulatory regime, and in turn the 
potential for mutual regulatory enrolment is that it provides ‘a normative 
framework for considering ways in which the capacity of the system as a whole 
might be enhanced effectively and legitimately by the careful deployment within 
it of the regulatory capacity of different actors’.98 Such an analysis also provides a 
lens through which governance response to regulatory change can be designed. 
As noted, both the configuration of actors and their relative resources are subject 
to change.99 Changes may thus require the search for enrolment of other and new 
actors, or other and newly acquired resources.
The domain of food safety has been subject to tremendous changes in the 
last two decades that have affected both positively and negatively the regulatory 
capacity—or power if you will—of actors in that domain.100 One transformation 
stands out, however, and that is the rise of global supply chains. In the following 
subsection, this change is discussed in greater detail, as well as the potential for the 
strategy of regulatory enrolment as a response to it. 
5.1 Global chains and national enforcement agencies
The food industry consists of firms that are concerned with the farming and 
production, packaging and distribution, and retailing and catering of food and 
97  Donal Casey (n 77) 257–60.
98  Julia Black (n 3) 91.
99  ibid 80.
100  Terry Marsden, Robert Lee, Andrew Flynn and Samarthia Thankappan (n 1) 3–23; Tetty 
Havinga, Donal Casey and Frans Van Waarden (n 1) 3–18.
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beverages. Food supply chains link the operations of these firms and include, at 
one end, a strongly fragmented market for producers, including farmers, growers 
and, at the other end, a very concentrated market dominated by major retailers, 
ie, supermarket chains. In the US, the top five supermarket chains accounted for 
almost 40% of retail food turnover in 2000, while in 1993 they accounted for some 
25%.101 In most European countries the five largest retailers account for between 
50% to over 70% of retail food.102 In addition, retailers in Western capitalist 
economies have been increasingly sourcing food products and ingredients across 
geopolitical boundaries, thus increasing the distance over which food is shipped 
and the number of jurisdictions they cross.103 These trends combined have 
created an environment in which ‘global food retailing increasingly resembles 
an international oligopoly composed of a limited number of multinationals with 
minor brand producers and non-branded producers being obliged to comply with 
the requirements and conditions set by retailers’.104
For a single public enforcement agency, the global scope of supply chains 
poses major challenges for its regulatory capacity to ensure safe food. While these 
chains have become increasingly global and frequently involve stages of production 
in different foreign territories, its own jurisdiction remains territorially defined. 
Furthermore, the sheer volume of trade in food products makes compliance with 
food safety regulation more troublesome and costly. In the Netherlands, for example, 
this is considered a serious problem since the country plays a significant role in the 
global trade of food. It leads global trade in vegetables—ranked highest with some 
12% of global trade—while for other food products its share is significant too.105 To 
retain this position, the Netherlands has a strong interest in ensuring the safety of 
imported food, yet this task might simply be impossible for a single public agency 
to meet adequately.
The loss of strategic positioning by national food safety agencies in a global 
context and a lack of authority and legitimacy to regulate food production in other 
101  Lawrence Busch and Carmen Bain, ‘New! Improved? The Transformation of the Global 
Agrifood System’ (2004) 69 Rural Sociol 321, 330.
102  OECD, ‘Private standards and the shaping of the agro-food system’, Doc. No. AGR/CA/
APM(2006)9/FINAL (Paris 2004) 11–12.
103  Linda Fulponi (n 54), 6–7.
104  Codex Alimentarius Commission (n 65) 5.
105  UN International Merchandise Trade Statistics 2011, ‘Vegetables, fresh, chilled, 
frozen, simply preserved; roots 054’ <http://comtrade.un.org/pb/FileFetch.aspx?doc 
ID=4527&type=commoditypagesnew> accessed 15 January 2016.
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countries invites these agencies to think about ways in which they could strengthen 
their regulatory capacity by enrolling the resources of others. In this context, 
transnational private certification schemes have entered the scene.106 Prominent 
agencies such as the FDA in the US, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency and 
NVWA in the Netherlands are engaging with GSFI and its individual benchmarked 
schemes to pave the way for the integration of these schemes in official inspection 
and enforcement policies.107 State actors thus seek to enrol critical resources of 
information, wealth, strategic position and organisational capacity in ever more 
globalising supply chains.
However, the enrolment of these transnational private certification schemes 
by national food safety agencies raises important questions about the design of 
such enrolment and the consequences in terms of democratic accountability of the 
agency doing the enrolling. For one thing, compliance with these schemes does not 
provide an absolute warranty for regulatory compliance under the legal framework. 
Public concern has increased following incidents of false and fraudulent certification 
within the food industry. A study carried out by the Dutch NVWA indicates that 
violations of food safety laws are still regularly observed amongst the firms that are 
certified for GFSI-recognised schemes, including the BRC Global Standard, IFS 
and FSSC 22000.108 Furthermore, auditors working under these schemes are paid 
by the audited food business operators, a situation which constitutes a structural 
conflict of interest between the financial interests of the auditor and protecting the 
public from food safety incidents that needs addressing.109 Also the fact that the 
functions of third party audits do not overlap with those of official inspections and 
that certain methodologies, such as sample testing, are not used limits the use of 
private schemes by public actors. 
Public actors are thus challenged to create operational frameworks within 
which they can assess and control how and under what conditions they integrate 
GFSI-benchmarked certification schemes into their policies for official inspection 
and enforcement. One key condition appears to be adequate information-sharing 
arrangements so that relevant changes in the status of certified firms are instantly 
106  Errol Meidinger, ‘Private Import Safety Regulation’, in Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel and 
David Zaring (eds), Import Safety: Regulatory Governance in the Global Economy (University 
of Pennsylvania Press 2009) 233.
107 Havinga and Verbruggen (n 92).
108  Hans Beuger, ‘Overheidstoezicht en certificatie: Verhogen betrouwbaarheid vergt inspanning 
van alle betrokkenen’ (2012) VMT 20, 21.
109  Timothy Lytton and Lesley McAllister (n 93) 304.
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communicated between the agency and a certification scheme.110 Reliable data 
on the status of individual certified firms and periodic meta-data on changes 
made to the substantive standards of the schemes, licenses and accreditations of 
certification bodies performing compliance audits are fundamental to ensuring 
trust between the agency and the scheme, and indeed to the effectiveness of the 
enrolment strategy. It has been observed that legal obstacles, eg, the professional 
confidentiality obligations of private auditors incorporated into the service 
contracts signed with food business operators, constitute institutional obstacles to 
ensuring the proper exchange of information between private schemes as regards 
non-compliance.111 This example also points to the limits of regulatory enrolment. 
As noted, the strategy does not offer full control to the actor doing the enrolling 
over the actor being enrolled.
6 Conclusion
Regulatory enrolment can be seen as an important contemporary governance 
response to changes in regulatory power. The study of, and engagement with, 
different actors occupying the regulatory space possessing a different configuration 
of resources for regulation allows actors to build their own regulatory capacity in 
new, uncertain and complex circumstances. The domain of food safety provides 
a wealth of information and examples of how, why and at what level actors enroll 
others for the purpose of achieving their regulatory goals. The principal strength 
of the concept of regulatory enrolment as developed by Black lies in the detailed 
analytical assessment it proposes of the actors, their relative capacity and underlying 
resources for regulation, as well as their deployment of such resources for specific 
regulatory functions. ‘New Governance’ is thus broken down into manageable units 
of analysis, without losing sight of the interplay between actors and their capacity 
to engage in regulatory activities. The disentangling of the properties of actors and 
the dynamics between them in a regulatory regime offers a proper analytical lens 
through which the nature of a regulation regime can be better understood and the 
capacity of that regime as a whole can be enhanced in smart and innovative ways.
110 Paul Verbruggen (n 96) 251.
111 Verbruggen and Havinga (n 57) 522.
